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The Brazilian economy, traditionally one of the most closed
in Latin America, was finally opened up to international trade
between 1988 and 1994. The impact of enormously increased
exposure to international trade was very different from what
had been foreseen, either by defenders or by critics of
liberalization. This paper seeks to describe the most
important changes subsequent to liberalization, by
comparing them to what happened in the classical period of
Brazilian industrialization. In both periods (1940-1980 and
1990-1999), there was rapid copying of features of industry
in the central economies. In both cases, then, catch-up
movements took place in the country. But there can be no
doubt that these two levelling processes differed greatly in
their characteristics, consequences and limitations. In this
paper, we attempt to contrast the main features of the two
movements.
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I
Facts and hypothesis
The starting point for this paper is a set of interrelated
hypotheses that can be summarized as follows.
By 1980 Brazil had established an industrial structure
in which the relative sizes and levels of diversification of
the different sectors broadly matched their counterparts
in medium-sized developed economies.
Between 1980 and 1994 the country suffered a
period of major macroeconomic upheaval, during which
few new factories were established or new production
techniques introduced – even the range of goods
produced by manufacturing industry remained largely
unchanged. At the height of the macroeconomic
turbulence there was also little point in firms’ trying to
increase productive efficiency.
When the policy to open up the economy was
announced in 1990, Japanese-style business
organization and management methods began to be
introduced in Brazil, having spread across the developed
economies during the 1980s. In the early years of the
decade, enterprises were caught in the crossfire between
shrinking markets and (initially moderate) import
growth, so change only became more widespread in
the second half of the 1990s (Barros de Castro, 2001).
The major expansion of domestic markets, in
conjunction with the local-currency overvaluation that
accompanied stabilization, encouraged many firms to
react to import competition by modernizing and
lowering the prices of their products. In doing so, they
apparently had no hesitation in expanding their own
purchases abroad.
The significance of this type of reaction, in which
imports act as a double-edged sword, is ambiguous: it
may indicate the start of an intensive process of
industrial modernization and recovery; or alternatively,
it could herald industrial decline. In either event, the
start of more profound changes, through increased
imports, would characterize both domestically-owned
and multinational firms alike.
The economy’s modest industrial performance in
the 1990s (2.7% growth per year) is usually contrasted
with the gains achieved in labour productivity. In fact,
industrial output per worker grew by an average of 8.5%
per year during the 1990s, according to the Monthly
Survey of Industry (PIM) published by the Brazilian
Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE), or 5.4%
according to the National Accounts (see Carvalho,
2000).
From the standpoint of this paper, however, the
following points are just as relevant as the changes seen
in average productivity indices:
— The structure, linkages and functioning of
industrial firms underwent profound change in the
1990s. These began with the adoption of new
management methods and patterns of work
organization and intensified as stabilization took
hold, with new inputs being introduced and
obsolete equipment gradually being replaced;
— This resulted in new range of products being
launched on the market;1
— Although the new products were more up-to-date,
they did not represent the state of the art in their
respective sectors. The new products were
technologically “mature” and “ready” for the market
(in the sense that demand for them already existed);
— The changes required to rapidly place the “new”
products on the market affected production first and
foremost – usually inside the factory gate (Barros de
Castro, 2001). In many cases, however, the process
was accompanied by mergers and take-overs, together
with cooperative ventures and partnerships. In
traditional industries, in particular, they were
sometimes reinforced by “new local arrangements”.2
— Lastly, the results achieved in terms of
manufacturing units seem to closely match those
of developed countries; at least, this is a point often
emphasized in field interviews. In fact, in the
subsidiaries of multinationals and most particularly
among newly established units (greenfield
investments), it is not uncommon for the new plants
to be more advanced, in certain respects, than the
best units existing in the firm’s country of origin.3
This by no means applies to all enterprises,
however, and two important factors need to be taken
into account.
1
 On this point, see Carvalho and Bernardes (1998).
2
 Cassiolato and Lastres eds. (2000) provide a survey of these changes.
3
 An important source of information on the intensive process of
enterprise change is the Empresas & Carreiras section of Gazeta
Mercantil, which publishes sectoral and regional reports on a periodic
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The combination of low wages, “informality”
(involving tax evasion and non-payment of social-
security contributions) and second-hand equipment
markets, tends to encourage outdated business practices
and low productivity. In addition, the decline in the
number of industrial workers from 1990 to 1999 helped
semi-marginal or marginal businesses to survive and
even flourish –employment fell to about 52% of its
previous level according to the IBGE Monthly Survey
of Industry (PIM). The long tailback of more or less
“informal” enterprises that benefit from such factors
clearly lowers general productivity levels and makes
international comparisons difficult. Far from indicating
industrial backwardness, however, this projects on to
the manufacturing sector the consequences of the
country’s economic and social heterogeneity –in
addition to the repressed activity levels that the economy
experienced on a recurrent basis during the 1990s. This
is reflected in the distribution of industrial firms by size,
average wage and industrial value-added (see Table 1).
This, in short, is a permissive environment in terms
of the survival chances of modest-sized firms with
limited resources;4  but it has not precluded a rapid
increase in (overall) average labour productivity. This
applies both to growth years and to periods when the
pace of output has slowed or even declined.
The second factor is that soon after stabilization
(roughly in 1995-1996) there were signs that Brazil
might follow the prevailing trend in Latin America at
the time, with industrial sectors disappearing and
activities becoming concentrated in the final stages of
production. Although this negative development was
largely avoided in the Brazilian case, the industrial
fabric by no means emerged unscathed, as the
electronics industry atrophied –having already been
facing serious difficulties prior to opening-up and
stabilization.
The following table 2 gives an idea of the continuity
of the industrial structure.
A summary of the hypothesis put forward in this
paper is presented below.
Brazil’s modern industrial structure, which was fully
established by around 1980, is the outcome of a
successful initial catch-up process. Then, following a
lengthy period of hibernation, the renewal/modernization
of the product basket and large-scale absorption of
organizational and technological improvements during
the 1990s, can be seen as a second catch-up phase. This
second stage differs in several ways from the first, but
both episodes share a key feature of all catch-up
processes, namely deliberate and rapid imitation of the
characteristics of industries in developed economies. A
brief digression on this point is needed here.
Following Gerschenkron (1962), various authors
have used the concept of “leapfrogging” to describe
how industrially backward nations attempt to catch up
with more advanced ones through imitation. In my
opinion, this approach offers a superior conceptual
framework than the more limited notion of “import
substitution”. The latter seeks to understand late
industrialization as a series of (automatic?) responses
to periods of constraint and slack in the balance of
payments. In addition to according a central role to the
decision to embark on change and to the institutions
established for that purpose (Barros de Castro, 1993),
the catch-up concept also gives due importance to
technological constraints.
In addition, this approach both emphasizes and
relativizes the concept of imitation – the basic
phenomenon in the historical leaps we are discussing
here. In practice, the copying process is subject to
historical adaptations and substitutions (as
Gerschenkron pointed out) and is therefore selective.
As traces of industrial heritage are usually conserved5
and individual differences develop along the way, the
process, if successful, is liable to produce a different
and even totally new reality.6
basis. The author is unaware of any way of adding to the copious
information contained there, and in other journals and publications.
Another important source are case studies (of firms) and sectoral
studies carried out by various research centres, which often end up
as postgraduate theses. For the early part of the decade, an important
source is the collection of studies that formed the basis for the Estudo
da Competitividade Industrial, carried out from August 1992 to
December 1993, coordinated by Luciano Coutinho and João Carlos
Ferraz, and published by UNICAMP in 1994. In view of the
unprecedented nature of the experience, however, there is no
substitute for collecting information through interviews with the
firms, and with the entrepreneurs and technical experts in the
industrial plants themselves. With regard to the high levels of
performance achieved in several sectors, see the McKinsey report,
Productivity - The key to an accelerated path for Brazil, 1998. There
is a further reservation, however: even in medium-to-large firms,
current wage levels in Brazil (especially for low-skilled jobs) continue
to justify automation levels below those seen in developed countries.
4
 According to the same source (IBGE, Pesquisa Industrial Anual -
Empresa 1999), small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for
91.5% of all firms, 26.7% of employment and 13.8% of net revenues
in 1985; and 93.7%, 37.8% and 15.2% respectively in 1999.
5
 The Japanese catch-up experience shows that restoring traces of
a distant past can be important for a concentrated industrial catch-
up effort.
6
 A very interesting paper on historical experiences of overcoming
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In the Brazilian case, the unprecedented nature of
the second industrial catch-up period is also clear: firms
took decisions and chose methods to achieve catch-up
individually. This forms part of the contrasts described
below.
TABLE 1
Brasil: Indicators of size, by number of persons employed, 1990
Size of firms by number of persons employeda Average monthly wage Industrial value added per worker
(reais)  (thousands of reais)
Micro/small  440 15.7
Medium 762 37.7
Large 1175 71.8
Industry total 793 42.0
Source: IBGE, Directorate of Surveys, Department of Industry, Pesquisa Industrial Anual - Empresa (Annual Survey of Industry - Enterprise),
1999.
a The classification criteria used are as follows: Micro/small - employing from 5 to 99 persons; Medium - from 100 to 499 employees; and
Large - employing 500 or more persons.
TABLE 2
Brasil: Structure of manufacturing industry by value-added,
at current prices, 1991 and 1998
(percentages)
1991 1998
04  Manufacture of non-metallic minerals 5.5% 5.5%
05  Iron and steel 4.2% 3.2%
06  Non-ferrous metallurgy 2.1% 1.7%
07  Manufacture of other metallurgical products 5.7% 5.3%
08  Manufacture and maintenance of machinery and tractors 7.9% 8.9%
10  Manufacture of electrical appliances and equipment 3.2% 2.7%
11  Manufacture of electronic appliances and equipment 3.9% 2.8%
12  Manufacture of automobiles, trucks and buses 2.6% 3 %
13  Manufacture of other vehicles, autoparts and accessories 3.9% 3.5%
14  Sawmills and manufacture of wooden articles and furniture 3.7% 3.3%
15  Paper and graphics 5.9% 4.1%
16  Rubber 1.6% 1.4%
17  Manufacture of chemical products (excl. petrochemicals) 3.8% 3.8%
18  Oil refining and petrochemicals 9.1% 14.8%
19  Manufacture of miscellaneous chemical products 5.2% 3.7%
20  Manufacture of pharmaceutical and perfume products 2.2% 4.5%
21  Plastics manufacturing 2.7% 2.6%
22  Textile industry 4.9% 2.6%
23  Manufacture of articles of apparel and accessories 3.1% 2.2%
24  Manufacture of shoes and leather and fur articles 1.6% 1.0%
25  Coffee industry 0.7% 1.2%
26  Processing of products of plant origin, including tobacco 3.7% 3.6%
27  Slaughtering and preparation of meat 2.1% 2.4%
28  Refrigeration and preparation of milk and dairy products 1.0% 1.5%
29  Sugar industry 1.0% 0.7%
30  Manufacture and refining of edible vegetable oils and fats 1.4% 1.9%
31  Other food and beverage industries 4.8% 5.9%
32  Miscellaneous industries 2.7% 2.0%
Source: IBGE, Department of National Accounts.
backwardness (or failing to do so) is Hiquino and Amsden (1994).
Amsden (2001) also presents a view of recent (post-World War II)
catch-up episodes. With regard to the rapid absorption of new
technologies and the conditioning factors and implications, see Lal
(2000).
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II
Stylized comparison of the two
catch-up episodes
There are both clear differences and major similarities
between the two catch-up periods, as described in
stylized form below.
The first phase can be viewed as a concentrated
effort to put together the material resources (plant and
equipment), work teams, and also know-how and
routines that would come to characterize manufacturing
operations. Much of the necessary knowledge is
acquired with the project, equipment and inputs,
through user instructions. From then on knowledge
presumably grows, along with experience gained in
plant operation. In principle, the greater the degree of
protection provided to the industry and the more
specific the context (which includes special institutions,
labour-force characteristics, infrastructure and available
raw materials), the greater the importance of knowledge
developed locally.
In the second catch-up phase, based on
modernization of work practices and management
methods, the guiding principle involved
“tropicalization”7  of products (and to some extent
processes) that had already been thoroughly mastered
in the leading economies. The aim, in short, was to
induce locally established firms to place imitations of
imported goods on the market at competitive prices.
The degrees of freedom available for local
initiatives in the second catch-up phase were severely
limited, because the process began when protectionism
was in full retreat. In this setting, any business initiative
had to face a barrage of imports – long repressed, in
great demand and now finally available. Moreover, it
needs to be remembered that the aim was to supply
products to the domestic market with levels of
performance, reliability, durability, and even
compatibility with ecological and legal requirements,
which firms in developed economies had long been
accustomed to providing.
This means that given the degrees of freedom
formerly guaranteed through domestic market
protection, imports tended to be even more avidly
imitated in the second phase than in the first. This is
not to deny the profound similarity with the first catch-
up phase: copying is the watchword in both cases.
Nonetheless, there are some striking differences.
With the major exception of recent investment
flows into the country, the second catch-up phase was
essentially based on extracting better results from
previously accumulated and/or developed resources,
including existing work teams which were now
downsized and retrained. Without denying the
importance of new (mostly imported) inputs and
equipment, investment in the traditional sense of the
word was not the lever of change this time. Instead it
was basically a question of recombining resources and
exploiting characteristics and properties that that were
already there, perhaps in latent form. In an operation
of this type, imports –embodying new-generation
know-how– play a crucial role.
All of this leaves an important issue unresolved,
however.
The adoption of more efficient or more advanced
inputs and equipment, supported by worker retraining
and a reconditioning of facilities, in many cases
generated significantly larger production capacity. What
happened to sectors where major capacity increases
could not be obtained by changing equipment and
inputs (and in which upgrading merely entailed
replacing a few items of peripheral equipment)? Various
firms producing basic inputs were in this situation. And
what about sectors in which significant technological
change required installation of new plant – oil refining
or the electronics complex, for example?
Plainly the second catch-up phase, as described
above, did not tend to resolve problems of this type.
There were no major investments in refineries (despite
4% annual growth in the demand for petroleum
products), or in the manufacture of electronic
components (where rapid technical progress had
generated major discontinuities).
A comparison of the two catch-up periods is
provided below:
The first phase saw new activity sectors established
in Brazil. The State defined directions, offered
incentives (such as credit on concessional terms), and
usually provided the basic services infrastructure.7 This is a widely used expression, especially by multinationals.
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In this context, public enterprises were conceived
of (and treated) as the executors of public policies, based
on “missions” entrusted to them. Private firms were now
seen as ways to cover gaps in the productive structure
that was being established (Barros de Castro, 1993). It
should also be recalled that in the Brazilian case foreign
direct investment was mainly used as a means of
establishing supply chains – such as in the automotive
industry (Shapiro, 1994).
In contrast, during the second phase there were no
directions prescribed by the public authorities –just
assumptions based on economic theory as to the likely
direction of the changes the reforms would produce
(Mesquita, 1999).
Although it was not receiving guidance from a
central decision-coordinator, manufacturing industry
does seem to have converged on relatively well-defined
patterns of action during the second catch-up phase.
Broad directions thus emerged as the sum of all the
decisions taken by enterprises individually, but seem
essentially to be have been defined by firms making
the most of their previously accumulated assets, and
by the pressing need for rapid imitation.
Possibly the clearest trend to emerge stems from the
fact that opening-up failed to elicit major intersectoral shifts
towards labour-intensive and/or natural-resource-intense
activities. The Brazilian case even failed to provoke a
tendency to specialize in low-skill labour-intensive
activities such as product assembly and finishing.
In the initial opening-up period (lasting till about
1995-1996) there were signs that Brazil might follow
the Latin American trend of shedding industrial sectors
and/or concentration on the final stages of
production.8  This retrograde outcome was avoided,
however, except in a few specific cases such as the
electronics industry.
Perhaps the most interesting and complex
example is provided by the automotive industry. In
this case, even recently arrived firms (whose supply
links are all external) have made efforts to attract their
large international suppliers into the country. A similar
pattern can be seen among assembly plants that are
well established in Brazil, which have recently started
to set up factories in new regions. It is true that the
import coefficient, especially in these cases, appears
to be far higher than the levels seen during the first
catch-up episode. With few exceptions, however,
genuine manufacturing does prevail over mere
assembly.9
In the case of certain traditional industries,
following a succession of mergers and/or disappearance
of the more precarious firms, a clear trend towards
reassertion and modernization has emerged during the
last few years. Regional decentralization of activities
that make intensive use of low-skilled labour is often a
prominent feature of this restructuring process, as
exemplified by developments in the textiles and
footwear industries.
8
 For a description of the new specialization hypothesis, see Katz
(2000).
9
 Among the few cases involving little more than assembly, the
Chrysler project in Paraná (producing the Dakota pick-up) has already
closed down. Moreover, it has not been easy to gain information on
the effective import coefficient. After stating that the national
coefficient was about 75%, one assembly-plant director claimed to
have no information on the import coefficient of his suppliers. In
other words, the 75% applies only to items purchased (locally) from
so-called “systemists” located nearby and from a few large domestic
suppliers. Strictly speaking, however, even the steel in the body panels
(not to mention the electronics, the processed plastics, the gear box,
etc.) are all imported. The low import coefficient therefore refers
only to purchases by the main company – which operates by
assembling kits supplied by the systemists. Given the difficulty of
establishing the true import coefficient, it is interesting to note that
when seeking to justify a price hike, a large assembly firm that has
been in the country for a long time stated that an average of 30% of
its costs were in dollars. See Éxportação é estratégia contra a alta
do dólar, State of São Paulo, 14 October 2001.
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III
The macroeconomic context
To complete the comparison of the two catch-up phases,
we now consider economy-wide results, especially
during the second period.
At the height of the first catch-up, between 1968
and 1980, industry grew by an astonishing 200% (i.e.
output tripled). Between 1991 and 2000, however,
cumulative growth in manufacturing industry amounted
to barely 20.7%!
This extraordinary contrast can be viewed from
various angles. First of all, it should be remembered
that during the second catch-up the economy was
severely and almost continuously constrained by public
policies – very high average interest rates outside the
really critical periods (see figure 1 below); and
unprecedented real interest-rate peaks during
emergency situations. While the first catch-up phase
was supported by (super-) active growth policies, in
the second phase macroeconomic adjustment was much
more than merely prioritized, and economic growth was
all but extinguished, in systematic albeit irregular
fashion.
This means that, in addition to being accompanied
by years of exchange-rate appreciation (which
heightened competition from imports), economic
opening occurred in a hostile macroeconomic
environment. Were it not for the potential to make
significant cost and price reductions in a number of
sectors (thereby taking advantage of the expansion of
the respective markets), the business sector would have
been in serious difficulties.
FIGURE 1
Brazil: Very short term real interest rates











































































































































a For Brazil, overnight rate. For Argentina, interbank rate for up to 15 days.
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Nonetheless, industry displayed strong
expansionary tendencies whenever macroeconomic
conditions allowed. In other words, average industrial
performance was mediocre, despite a capacity to
respond vigorously to any opportunities that arose.
In short, the economy’s stop-go performance,
caused by the high inflation that prevailed from the
failure of the Cruzado Plan (1986) until the launch of
the Real Plan in 1994, was followed by stop-go of
another kind. In the first period there was the growing
threat of transition to hyperinflation; in the second, it
became increasingly clear that the stop phase was being
triggered by the potential shortfall in external financing.
The current pattern of restarts, followed by stop
and a return to austerity, has changed over time,
however.
The first reason for this is that when vulnerability
is detected, it tends progressively to affect expectations
– and the country is perceived (and treated) as part of a
high-risk group. In these conditions, expansionary
upturns are limited to sudden spurts (the “go” phase)
that are essentially demand-driven and rapidly supplied
(consumer durables especially). When economic agents
perceive this vulnerability, they themselves respond to
the negative signals by cutting back on expenses and
halting the expansion. Recently (in the second and third
quarters of 2001) such pro-cyclical behaviour caused
demand to fall ahead of supply, which supposedly was
being restrained by measures announced by the
Government to tackle the electric-power shortage.
On the other hand, and contrary to the pattern
described above, investment of both imported and
domestically produced capital goods ran ahead of durable
goods consumption for the first time during the latest
short but vigorous upturn. Both certainly benefited from
the lowering of interest rates (shown in table 1), which
was mainly associated with the recently adopted flexible
exchange-rate regime. Nonetheless, there are no signs
that the rate cuts (which have already been partially
reversed) were sufficient to generate investments in
sectors where plant upgrading, through inputs and
equipment, make little difference to installed capacity.
To complete these brief comments, in contrast to
the marked instability that accompanied the second
catch-up phase, the first period followed a relatively
stable growth path.10  Clearly this represents a further
divergence between the expectations of the proponents
of major reforms, and the results obtained.
IV
Brief concluding remarks
Returning to the issue of how firms have adapted to the
new environment, the domestic market is now similar
to the international one in terms of the products
demanded by consumers. But this does not mean that
Brazilian-based firms –whether domestic or
multinational– have assimilated in structure and
behaviour to their counterparts elsewhere. This question
is now considered in greater detail.
With the intensive modernization of processes,
products and marketing, under pressure from opening-
up and the mass arrival of new firms in the country
(430 of the 500 largest multinational corporations now
have operations in Brazil), subsidiary firms reproduce
only a few aspects of their corporate structure in the
domestic context. In fact they often establish only one
or two of their many productive units in Brazil.
At the same time, by clearly prioritizing operational
functions, domestic firms paradoxically find themselves
adopting structures similar to those of foreign
subsidiaries – except, of course, for the important fact
that management is located in Brazil. This is
understandable, for opening up meant that firms had to
sell imitations of imported goods on the domestic
market, as rapidly as possible and at competitive prices.
It was mainly the mode of production that had to be
changed – firms did not need to set up or perform
corporate functions such as R&D, design or brand
creation/management.
Keeping the focus on domestically-owned
enterprises, a major implication of the above is that
firms had no need for large amounts of financing, so it
10
 The only major fluctuation in industrial output growth during
the lengthy classical catch-up phase took place following the Targets
Plan (the effects of which lasted until 1961 and ensured an industrial
growth rate of over 10% per year) during the period of
macroeconomic crisis and readjustment (1963-1965), when
industrial growth was nil.
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is hardly surprising that their behaviour was largely
unresponsive to interest rates. It is also unsurprising
that the firms proved capable of enduring an extremely
virulent stop-go regime without being blown off-course
in the second catch-up period.
To draw another implication, whose importance
can hardly be overstated, a broader perspective is
needed.
The current instability of the Brazilian economy
is partly explained by (growing) instability in the
globalized economy. But there are also local factors in
play, at least two of which are intrinsically linked to
the features of the second catch-up phase discussed
above.
As mentioned earlier, the goods with which
Brazilian-based firms carved out spaces in the domestic
market were already mature products in industrialized
countries – in other words their markets were already
more or less saturated. This meant that, although the
production of imitation goods at low cost enabled firms
to compete in domestic markets (which were still
relatively under-supplied), abroad it was another matter.
As late arrivals in those markets, firms would have “to
buy” market space through predatory competition, or
else conquer markets using competitive tools embodied
in the high-level functions they did not possess.
In the final analysis, export-led expansion would
mean embarking on a different path – learning to grow
in a different environment, developing and making use
of other resources. That was not the struggle the firms
had embarked upon. Moreover, if they had done so,
their objectives would have had to reach far beyond
manufacturing excellence. They did not have the time
or resources needed for this, so the different
characteristics prevailing in the domestic and external
markets ended up requiring different profiles and
strategies.
We know, however, that the surge in imports was
an improvised expedient to rapidly attain
competitiveness. Having said that, if the dollar had
devalued, the resulting cost pressures would have
encouraged enterprises to cultivate or even re-establish
local supply chains. Given the dollar’s appreciation
from 1994 to January 1999, however, importing
continued to act as a powerful cost-containing
mechanism.
The difficulty of exporting compounded by a lack
of incentives for import substitution generated a
growing imbalance in the country’s external accounts,
bringing with it a major distortion whereby a dollar
earned by a firm on the external market (or saved
through import substitution) became worth much more
for the economy as a whole than for the individual firm.
Statements by firms, dating at least from 1997, showed
that their initial difficulties in the struggle for the
domestic market had been overcome. Nonetheless, the
situation of the country as a whole was becoming
increasingly vulnerable.
It is against this backdrop that devaluation should
be viewed. For reasons mentioned above, however, it
is important to remember that this corrects prices – but
does not reverse the earlier accommodation. As an
industrialist from the electronics sector recently
remarked, Brazil “is not producing the products they
want to buy”. In other words, with the products they
have available, the solution is to gain market share
through predatory pricing – which, moreover, would
ultimately be made possible by the additional 40%
devaluation that has taken place over the past 12 months.
The above discussion can be used to formulate a
problem that is likely to become increasingly important
in the future.
If the rapid and substantial fall in the relative prices
of manufactured products (which occurred in the second
catch-up phase, but was clearly absent in the first)
merely represented a realignment of prices imposed by
opening up, it would be of very limited importance. Its
significance would be greater, however, if efforts were
then made to develop new competitive tools capable of
lowering costs and/or gaining new market positions
(through progress on other fronts) on a recurrent basis.
In this case the firms would not be merely adapting to
prices and product modernization provoked by opening-
up, but would be preparing to continuously reassert
themselves in a competitive economic environment that
had not existed previously. They would also be shaking
off a long period in which their interaction with markets
had been practically zero – while preparing to enter
another scenario in which markets are segmented,
recreated or even created by the firms. But this entails
going beyond the second catch-up phase – and points
to need for one final leap (to be made by the enterprises
established here) if the aim really is to achieve sustained
growth.11
11
 An attempt to describe this final step or “strategic catch-up phase”
is made in Barros de Castro and Proença (2001).
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